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Orleans is denied constitutional jurisdiction to establish paternity
in civil cases as well as in prosecutions under R.S. 14:74 by
the present decision, a constitutional amendment will be necessary if it is desired that the juvenile court exercise jurisdiction
over such cases. 24 Regardless of whether an adequate civil rem-

edy is provided or the criminal procedure is revised to meet the
Supreme Court's objection, it is important that some procedure
be made available to impose the burden of supporting the
illegitimate offspring of known fathers on those parents rather
than on a welfare agency of the state.
Jack Brittain
CRIMINAL LAW -

FELONY-MURDER -

KILLING OF CO-FELON

In the retreat from a store at which they had committed
armed robbery, two felons were pursued by the proprietor, who
fatally shot one of them. The surviving felon was indicted under
the felony-murder statute. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the evidence, and the Commonwealth appealed. Held, reversed.' "The killing of the co-felon is the
natural foreseeable result of the initial act. The robbery was
the proximate cause of the death."'2 Commonwealth v. Thomas,

382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
The felony-murder doctrine is a fiction developed in the
common law of England to charge with murder those engaged
in a dangerous felony from which any death results. 3 The requirement of malice for common law murder is fulfilled under
the felony-murder doctrine by ascribing to the felon who only
incidentally kills the malice of the lesser felony. 4 Historically
the felony-murder doctrine seems to have been limited at first
solely to the acts committed by the felon himself." This was the
original and long-standing interpretation of the doctrine in the
United States." Thus, when the instigators of a riot were on
24. In order to insure all juvenile courts equal jurisdiction over these cases,
LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 52, 53, 96, should also be amended.
1. Three of the seven justices dissented.
2. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 645, 117 A.2d 204, 206 (1955).
3. A discussion of the origin and reason for the doctrine can be found in
Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DICK. L. REv.
3 (1948).
4. Ibid.
5. 3 COKE,INSTITUTES 56 (1797) ; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 192 (1769).
6. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) ; Commonwealth
v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson,
321 Pa. 327, 184 At]. 97 (1936) ; Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
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trial for the death of an innocent bystander, they were acquitted
because it could not be shown that it was their act, and not that
of the suppressing soldiers, which caused the homicide. 7 Early
in the twentieth century the doctrine was extended to include

the criminal liability of a felon for the death of an innocent
party placed in a hazardous position by the felon and killed by

a person resisting the crime.8 Later the courts applied the doctrine to felons who precipitated a situation in which one re-

sisting the felony inadvertently killed an innocent party.9 The
instant decision, involving the death of one of the perpetrators
rather than an innocent victim, holds the felon liable for any

homicide that could be reasonably foreseen to follow from his
felonious act. 10 The decision epitomizes the increasing trend
toward extending the application of the felony-murder doctrine

by incorporating the tort law concept of proximate cause into
criminal law."

The Louisiana Criminal Code provides that murder is the
killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the
perpetration of certain enumerated felonies.' 2 Only one Louisiana case, State v. Bessar, has interpreted the limits of the Code's
7. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863).
8. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934) (bank teller, used as
a shield by escaping robbers, killed by an officer) ; Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim.
621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900) (railroad train fireman, forced to seek entrance to the
express car being defended by its occupants killed in the cross fire between robbers and defenders); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900)
(same incident as Keaton case) ; Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
9. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952) (officer killed
by a fellow officer in resisting the armed robbery of a bank) ; Commonwealth v.
Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949) (in robbery of market, policeman
killed, whether by the felons or the resisting officers was irrelevant) ; Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947) (gasoline station attendant
killed in a robbery, whether by the felons or the owner of the station was immaterial) ; Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1955) (dictum) ; Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
10. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). Contra,
People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 300, 127 N.E. 75, 78 (1920) (dictum) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 100, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905) (dictum). The dicta
in the latter two cases anticipated the situation in the instant case and ruled the
felony-murder doctrine inapplicable to those facts. The majority in the Thomas
case refused to follow this restricted interpretation. Though the problem of conspiracy is often present in felony-murder cases, it does not affect the basic development pointed out above.
11. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955) passim;
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 198, 53 A.2d 736, 745 (1947).
12. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950) : "Murder is the killing of a human being:
"(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm; or
"(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to
kill."
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felony-murder provision, and that case dealt merely with the
duration of the vicarious liability. Then Justice Fournet construed the felony-murder statute to include homicide committed
in an attempt to escape from the scene of the crime, or at the
conclusion of the original offense for the purpose of preventing
detection. 13 The court stated by way of dictum that "all [felons]
are criminally responsible for the death . .. that ensues as a
14
natural consequence of the common felonious purpose."'
In the instant case the majority of the Pennsylvania court
indicated that in its view criminal liability under the felonymurder doctrine should encompass any death occurring during
the course of the felony. Whether the deceased was an innocent
victim or a participant in the felony was of no importance. The
court based this extension of the felony-murder doctrine on the
deterring effect that such a strict application might have on
criminal tendencies. 15 In his dissent Justice Jones suggested that
the felony-murder doctrine should only apply to a felon when he
or his co-felon had killed a person. He reasoned that it was an
anomaly to hold a co-felon guilty of murder for a justifiable
homicide committed by one resisting the felony. He indicated
that this erroneous result was reached by an imputation to the
felon of the act of killing rather than of the malice, since there
could be no malice implied from a justifiable homicide. 16 Justice
Musmanno dissented on the ground that since the philosophy
of criminal law is to punish wrong, criminal liability could not
17
be based upon a justifiable homicide.
A proper application of the felony-murder rule involves a
balancing of the need for protection of society with the humanitarian concept that the punishment should be no more severe
than the gravity of the individual's conduct warrants.'
The
Pennsylvania solution in the instant case tends to ignore the
latter element. Although the language of the Louisiana court
in the Bessar case is broad, it should be construed in the light
13. State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948). The charge to the
jury was to the effect that the defendant would be responsible for his own acts and
those of a conspirator, but not for acts of one opposing the felony. This is an
example of the original interpretation of the felony-murder doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court was not called upon to rule on this point in the charge.
14. Id. at 310, 34 So.2d at 789.
15. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
16. Id. at 659, 117 A.2d at 213.
17. Id. at 678, 117 A.2d at 221.
18. Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application
Under the New York Statutes, 20 COHN. L.Q. 288, 312 (1935).
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of the actual holding of that case, and does not necessarily
imply that the felony-murder doctrine should be carried to the
extreme of imposing responsibility where one of the perpetrators is justifiably killed. It is submitted that a judicious balancing of the factors already mentioned should preclude the
Louisiana courts from following the regrettable extension of the
felony-murder doctrine in Pennsylvania.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW -

THEFT -

MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO

FUTURE FACTS
Defendant agreed to purchase three automobiles from a car
dealer and to pay for them by issuing sight drafts payable two
days from date. At the time he knew his funds in the drawee
bank were insufficient to cover the drafts. Subsequently he sold
the automobiles to third persons without having paid any part
of the purchase price. To a charge of theft defendant pleaded
that the information did not charge a crime, contending that
the drafts were mere promises to pay in the future and hence
were representations as to future events. Defendant was nevertheless convicted. Held, affirmed. Article 67 of the Criminal
Code' which provides in part that any "fraudulent conduct, practices or representations" constitutes theft, includes fraudulent
representations as to future, as well as to past and existing,
facts. State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d 601 (1955).
At common law the crime of obtaining property by false pre2
tenses is limited to representations of past or existing facts.
False representations as to future facts, no matter how misleading or dishonest, will not serve as a basis of criminal liability.3 At first the crime was limited under the common law to
the fraudulent use of false weights and measures. 4 Later it was
1. "Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs

to another, either without the consent of the owner or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently
of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential."
LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).

2. Jones v. State, 236 Ala. 30, 182 So. 404 (1938) ; United States v. Pearce,
7 Alaska 246 (1924) ; Willis v. State, 34 Ariz. 363, 271 Pac. 725 (1938) ; Territory v. Toak, 33 Hawaii 560 (1935) ; People v. Widmayer, 265 Mich. 547, 251
N.W. 540 (1938).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. Rex v. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1124, 97 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B. 1761) ; HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SOCIETY 46 (2d ed. 1952).

